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Abstract 
This article reconsiders the concept of autonomy of migration (CAM) in the context of 
technologically ever more sophisticated border regimes by focusing on the case of biometric 
rebordering. As its name suggests, the CAM’s core thesis proposes that migratory movements 
yield moments of autonomy in regards to any attempt to control and regulate them. Yet, the 
CAM has been repeatedly accused of being based on and contributing to a romanticisation of 
migration. After outlining two advantages the CAM offers for the analysis of biometric border 
regimes, I demonstrate that processes of biometric rebordering increase the warranty of the 
two allegations, which feed this major critique. Drawing on examples relating to the Visa 
Information System (VIS), I show, moreover, that processes of biometric rebordering alter the 
practical terms and material conditions for moments of autonomy of migration to such an 
extent that it becomes necessary to rethink not only some of the CAM’s central features, but 
the notion of autonomy itself. In the final section I therefore point out some directions to 
develop the CAM as an approach, which is better equipped to investigate today's struggles of 
migration without being prone to the critique of implicating a romanticisation of migration. 
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[…] there is an autonomy of emigration adverse to the politics of states and this accounts for emigration as well 
as immigration. […] Though myriads of experts and officials in the administrative bodies of state institutions 
and international organisations are preoccupied with emigration, they have no clue about this independence or 
autonomy of migration flows. […] One can counteract emigration with repressive means, ‘advance’ the return of 
immigrants, but one can not open or block the flows from one’s point of view and programming.1 
 
 
Since Yann Moulier Boutang postulated the hypothesis of an autonomy of migration, scholars 
from around the world have tried – often independently from one another – to develop it into 
a ‘heuristic model’2 to investigate and intervene in the struggles of migration.3 This article 
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understands itself as a contribution to this ongoing undertaking. It argues that the material 
terms and practical conditions for the emergence of possible moments of autonomy of 
migration have changed significantly due to the increased technologisation of border regimes. 
Yet, the existing literature on the concept of autonomy of migration (CAM) has so far not 
sufficiently acknowledged the impact of the technologisation of border controls on the 
possibilities of migrants to appropriate what contemporary border and migration regimes seek 
to deny them, namely: mobility and rights. What has hindered the advocates of the CAM so 
far to take the technologisation of border controls and its effects on migrants’ room for 
manoeuvre seriously is the misreading of the interrelated securitisation of migration as a mere 
means for the economic exploitation of migrant labour.
4
 This is why the CAM’s core 
hypothesis has been largely articulated as an unqualified generalisation to date: moments of 
autonomy seem to emerge and operate within any border and migration regime irrespective of 
its legal, practical and technological composition.  
In this article I therefore reconsider the CAM in face of the ongoing technologisation 
of border controls by focusing on the challenges posed by biometric rebordering. My analysis 
is driven by the following question: In which directions has the CAM to be refined to better 
account for the impact of the technologisation of border control on the emergence of possible 
moments of autonomy of migration?  
To answer this question, I first outline six core features of the CAM. This enables me 
to bring out two conceptual advantages the CAM yields for the investigation and critique of 
biometric border regimes. In the second and third section I reconsider the two allegations that 
fuel the major critique, according to which the CAM is based on, but also contributes to a 
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romanticisation of migration. It becomes more urgent to address these criticisms, as their 
warranty increases in the context of biometric rebordering. In the final section I therefore 
point out some directions for re-thinking the CAM in order to develop it as an approach that is 
better equipped to investigate and intervene in today’s struggles of migration within and 
against technologically ever more sophisticated border regimes and which is no longer prone 
to the critique of contributing to a romanticisation of migration. 
 What makes this undertaking necessary is the ‘technological imperative’5 driving 
processes of rebordering in Europe and around the globe. In the context of Europe, the 
gradual build-up of the surveillance system SIVE along Spanish coasts since 1999 offers an 
illuminating example. It comprises a network of mobile infrared cameras and high resolution 
radars, granting patrol boats of the Guardia Civil a response time of up to three hours for 
intercepting boats with undocumented migrants before their expected arrival on Spanish 
shores.
6
 So far the CAM’s proponents have argued that neither the implementation of ever 
more restrictive migration policies nor the introduction of technologically ever more 
sophisticated border controls could inhibit migration, but only downgrade the conditions, 
under which it occurs.
7
 Indeed, one can trace how the gradual build-up of SIVE implicated a 
geographical shift to longer and more dangerous migration routes to areas, where it had not 
yet been installed.
8
 But what happens if an avoidance of technologically highly sophisticated 
border controls is no longer possible, because they have become generalised? This is by no 
means a hypothetical question. In the EUROSUR project the European Union (EU) seeks to 
integrate existing national systems like SIVE into a ‘system of the systems’ covering its entire 
maritime border. It also seeks to bring existing surveillance and interception mechanisms to 
perfection through improved sensors, satellites and unmanned vehicles.
9
  
Moreover, EUROSUR is just one expression of the endorsement of technology as a 
cornerstone of ongoing processes of rebordering in Europe.
10
 It is complemented by proposals 
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for an entry-exit-system using biometric technologies to record the arrival and departure dates 
of travellers, who are not EU citizens, or a ‘registered traveller programme’ permitting 
participants to enter through automated gates under the condition that they submit themselves 
to a screening procedure prior to their departure.
11
 While these examples are still projects in 
the making, the EU has already build-up an impressive architecture of biometric databases, 
including the EURODAC system for asylum seekers and unauthorised border crossers, the 
Visa Information System (VIS) for all third country nationals applying for a Schengen visa 
and, finally, the Schengen Information System (SIS) that registers, among others, migrants 
who are deported after being apprehended inside the Schengen area.
12
 In this article I illustrate 
my general claims concerning the impact of the technologisation of border controls on the 
practical terms and material conditions for the possible emergence of moments of autonomy 
of migration through examples relating to the VIS. 
 
 
Politicising the technologisation of border regimes with the CAM: beyond the control bias 
It is important to note that the CAM has always been conceived by its proponents as a 
political intervention in both migration policy discourse and the politics of the antiracist 
movement. This brings me to the first of the CAM’s six central features that I will outline in 
this section. First, and in contrast to some of the most influential migration theories, the CAM 
stresses the subjective and social dimensions of migration in order to critique any conception 
of migration as a dependent variable of ‘objective’ factors like poverty or wage differentials, 
as suggested by neoclassical migration theories, or the destruction of subsistence economies 
through the expansion of capitalism in the global South, as suggested by the world-system 
theory.
13
 Any reduction of migration to structural underlying causes ignores the subjective 
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desires and projects migrants pursue with their migrations, thereby eliminating the political 
moments migratory movements comprise. The CAM’s advocates attribute the autonomy of 
migration, by contrast, to the uncontrollable plenitude of thousands of independent decisions, 
which are taken by migrants for a wide variety of different reasons on a daily basis. It is this 
subjective dimension of migration that Sandro Mezzadra seeks to underscore with the notion 
of escape.
14
 It produces a surplus of sociability, which exceeds the capacities of any border 
regime to regulate migratory movements entirely.
15
  
Therefore, migration is conceived, second, as a ‘dynamic force’ with the potential to 
instigate social transformation processes.
16
 In brief, the subjective movement of living labour 
constitutes a driving force in the evolution of capital accumulation.
17
 The institution of wage 
labour as a crucial moment in the history of capitalism was, for instance, prompted by the 
escape of slaves from the plantation economies.
18
 Likewise, contemporary migrations are 
structurally in excess of the equilibriums of (national) labour markets and codified forms of 
citizenship, that practices of rebordering try to maintain, thereby forcing these (and other) 
institutions into a process of permanent reorganisation and adaptation.
19
 This conception of 
migration as a constituent force leads the CAM’s advocates to read ‘migration in itself as an 
articulation of political and social struggles.’20  
From this understanding of migration follows, third, that the CAM’s advocates refute 
any victimisation of migrants. For any victimising discourse erases migrants capacity to 
subvert border controls, which in turn enables to ignore the fact, that ‘migrants have a will of 
their own, one that lies outside of the hands of those who wish to [help or] control them.’21 
Accordingly, the representation of migrants as needy victims enables paternalistic proxy 
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policies as pursued by humanitarian organisations like the UNHCR, but also by some groups 
of the antiracist movement.
22
 Or, even worse, it is exploited by advocates of migration control 
as a justification for the build-up and perfection of border controls. The costly EUROSUR 
project cited in the introduction offers an illuminating example for this justification strategy: 
‘The tragic death toll resulting from this kind of illegal immigration [in boats across the 
Mediterranean] is unacceptable and must therefore be significantly reduced. The capacity to 
detect small boats in the open sea must be enhanced, contributing to greater chances of search 
and rescue and thereby saving more lives at sea.’23 
But the reading of migration as a constituent force also entails important consequences 
for the conception and analysis of borders. For the CAM’s proponents suggest, fourth, that 
migratory movements temporarily precede the attempts to control, regulate and valorise 
them.
24
 From this follows, fifths, that the analytical starting point of the CAM relies on a 
reversal of the state-centred perspective, which is shared by the majority of migration studies, 
as Stephen Castles has rightly criticised.
25
 It is precisely this reversal of the state and control 
perspective, in which the CAM’s theoretical legacy of autonomist Marxism comes to the fore. 
In contrast to the assumption of orthodox Marxism, whereupon the course of history is 
determined by economic laws inherent to the capitalist mode of production, autonomist 
Marxists regard the social and political struggles of the working class as the ‘motor of history’ 
and therefore make them the central reference point for any empirical investigation and 
theoretical consideration.
26
 In this vein, Moulier Boutang calls upon migration scholars to 
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assume the mobile perspective of the movement of migration in order to ask, how migrants 
try to overcome and subvert border controls.
27
 
Consequently and finally, the advocates of the CAM criticise any representation of 
borders as impenetrable walls, as suggested by the influential metaphor of Fortress Europe, 
which dominated the slogans and campaigns of the antiracist movement in Europe throughout 
the 1990s. In brief, they criticise the latter for not capturing migrants’ capacity to render 
borders porous and, hence, the moments of autonomy of migration. Moreover, they maintain 
that the image of the fortress would not account for the productivity of border controls. 
Instead of conceiving border controls as repressive means aiming at the exclusion of migrants, 
the CAM’s proponents suggest that today’s border regimes follow a rationale of ‘differential 
inclusion.’28 Border controls create the conditions for migrants’ economic exploitation 
through their gradual, but systematic disenfranchisement.
29
 Therefore, the CAM’s advocates 
understand ‘illegality’ not as a legal (non-)status, but as an actively produced, albeit contested 
condition that aims at disciplining migrants to a docile, flexible and exploitable workforce by 
rendering them ‘deportable’.30 They emphasise, however, that it is migrants in the first place, 
who render borders porous. Accordingly, it is migrants’ practices that recode the devices of 
border control into mechanisms, that still enable mobility and labour, but only under the 
precarious conditions of ‘illegality’.31 Consequently, the CAM’s proponents conceptualise 
borders not as the impenetrable walls of an imagined fortress, but as dynamic sites of 
contestation and negotiation, where migrants’ practices and tactics encounter the strategies 
and devices of control, entering a ‘relationship of reciprocal determination.’32 
 To my mind, it is precisely the strategic-analytical prioritisation of migrants’ practices 
and the related conception of borders as sites of contestation and conflict, which constitute 
two important advantages the CAM contributes to the analysis of biometric borders. These 
conceptual and analytical advantages entail, in turn, crucial political implications. It should be 
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noted that they concern the investigation of technologically ever more sophisticated border 
regimes in general beyond the case of biometric borders discussed here. 
First, the CAM is well equipped to counter the control bias that characterises the 
existing literature on biometric border controls. The bulk of this literature focuses its analysis 
on the practices, technologies, installations, devices, statements and agencies that characterise 
the appearance and make-up of biometric borders in specific contexts, sites or programmes in 
order to reveal their key features, underlying rationalities and effects.
33
 Those, who are 
abjectified by being rendered as ‘risky’ by biometric border controls, conversely, only appear 
as passive targets of practices of surveillance, control and exclusion. Consequently, their 
practices and tactics that are geared towards the subversion of biometric border controls 
remain unexplored. As a result of this neglect, the existing literature overvalues the efficiency 
of biometric and other border control technologies. Such control biased analyses then tend to 
represent biometric borders as ‘omnipotent control apparatuses’34, which are actually capable 
of facilitating the mobility of ‘trusted travellers’ by efficiently restricting the mobility of those 
classified as ‘risky’. Biometric borders appear as the promised ultimate technological fix 
capable to reconcile the two allegedly conflicting ‘governmental desires [of] security and 
mobility’ that constitute the ‘problem of the border’ in the age of globalisation.35 In the end, 
control biased analyses of biometric borders involuntarily confirm and even fuel the claims, 
which justify and drive the implementation of biometric technologies in the first place.
36
  
By making the practices of abjectified migrants the starting and focal point of any 
investigation of borders the CAM allows for avoiding such control biased analyses. Today’s 
biometric borders no longer appear as mere technological installations perfectly regulating 
human mobility. They rather emerge as what Vicki Squire calls borderzones: as dispersed 
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sites of intensified political struggles over the selective denial and appropriation of mobility 
and rights.
37
 The technological details of biometric border controls are no longer catalogued 
in a meticulous description of supposedly omnipotent control apparatuses. They rather emerge 
as the terrain of as well as stakes within migrants’ struggles over the direct appropriation of 
mobility and rights. These silent and clandestine, but inherently political struggles manifest 
themselves in those multiple sites and situations, in which the practices and tactics of 
abjectified migrants encounter the techniques and devices of control. It is through the 
empirical investigation of these encounters by means of a multi-sited ethnography that 
scholars can bring out these multiple struggles, thereby avoiding a static and control biased 
analysis.
38
 As a result, today’s biometric borders would no longer appear as sites of perfect 
mobility control, ultimately constituting a ‘cyber-fortress’ in the making.39 They would rather 
emerge as the battleground of dynamic political struggles over the selective denial and direct 
appropriation of mobility and rights. 
It is this conception of biometric borders as sites of political struggles, through which 
the CAM permits researchers, secondly, to counter the de-politicisation of border controls 
implicated by their technologisation. Philppe Bonditti has rightly argued that ‘[t]he excessive 
resorting to technology effectively hides the political character of problems that technology is 
intended to solve.’40 More precisely, it is the underlying representation of border controls as a 
mere technical problem that can be ‘solved’ through the implementation of innovative control 
technologies, which brings about the de-politicisation of the practices they involve, the effects 
they produce as well as of the context, in which they take place.
41
 Many authors follow Didier 
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Bigo’s observation, whereupon technologies like biometrics and related techniques like ‘risk 
profiling’ are performative as they permit security professionals to monopolise the authority 
to define what or who constitutes a ‘risk’ as well as to decide how and by what means to 
neutralise them.
42
 These highly political questions are reduced to mere technical problems, 
which can be ‘solved’ by certain ‘experts’, who are endued with a secret ‘insider knowledge’ 
due to their access to information and surveillance technologies. These technologies in turn 
accord the ‘insider knowledge’ claimed by security professionals an aura of objectivity and 
scientific certainty, making it difficult, if not impossible, for others to contest their accounts, 
decisions and practices.
43
 The successful representation of border controls as purely technical, 
apolitical issues only certain experts can have a say on due to their proclaimed ‘professional 
expertise’, in turn, invests the technologisation of border controls with a self-perpetuating 
dynamic.
44
 The failure of technologies to deliver the promised perfect security translates into 
a call for the implementation of more and better technologies by security professionals. 
 In this context, the CAM allows critical scholars to precipitate a re-politicisation of 
border controls by depicting them as the terrain of political struggles, which can not be solved 
through the implementation of technologies, because they concern the access of abjectified 
migrants to mobility and rights. These struggles and contestations are initiated by migrants’ 
attempts to appropriate what border controls seek to deprive them of: mobility and rights. 
Consequently, migrants’ practices of direct appropriation and the struggles they instigate are 
inherently political in themselves. For it is these practices of abjectified migrants, which 
render today’s biometric borders, as well as the legally codified forms of citizenship and the 
socioeconomic status quo they try to maintain, as objects of contestation and dissent.
45
 
Attempts to counter the de-politicisation of border controls afford, therefore, that scholars 
follow the CAM’s suggestion to conceive migrants not as passive objects of control, but as 
crucial actors in the make-up of the multiple sites and situations at today’s biometric borders. 
It is then an investigation of migrants’ practices of direct contestation and appropriation, 
which has to be the starting and focal point of an analysis of biometric borders that aims at 
their re-politicisation. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Moreover, numerous scholars in critical security studies have criticised that the discriminatory effects of border 
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The CAM revisited I: autonomy or romanticisation of migration? 
The CAM is, however, not without problems itself. As I have noted in the introduction, the 
CAM, and most importantly, its generalised attribution of moments of autonomy to any 
migratory movement are repeatedly criticised for being based on as well as contributing to a 
romanticisation of migration. This major critique is fuelled by two interrelated allegations. 
Considering each of these two allegations in this section and the next, I demonstrate that their 
warranty increases in the context of biometric rebordering. 
 First, the CAM is accused of not sufficiently considering the diversity of conditions, 
under which migration occurs.
46
 According to critics, this diversity of conditions arises from 
both migrants’ unequal access to resources and the varying degrees of discrimination they 
experience due to the prevalence of sexist and racist discourses throughout the migration 
process. Martina Benz and Helen Schwenken attribute this neglect to the notion of autonomy 
itself that would reduce the diverse social conditions surrounding migration to a juxtaposition 
of state versus migrants.
47
 The CAM would frame migrants as a single autonomous collective 
subject, while ignoring their different subject positions and the specific constraints and 
privileges these subject positions entail. Following the concept of triple oppression, they insist 
that the combined, but individually varying effects of racism, sexism and capitalism have to 
be considered in order to assess in how far particular migrations yield emancipatory results or 
rather contribute to the re-articulation of relations of domination and exploitation. 
Members of Transit Migration have in turn refuted this criticism as a misinterpretation 
of the CAM, which would emphasise the autonomy of migratory movements, but not of 
individual subjects.
48
 They argue that Benz and Schwenken’s critique reflects a ‘naïve 
empiricism of the subject’, which confuses the difference between a situated analysis of the 
border regime from the perspective of migration with a purely empirical investigation of 
migrants’ subjectivities. They maintain, by contrast, that such a situated analysis can only be 
attained by using border-transgressing biographies and the practices of migration as empirical 
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samples, but not by studying the ‘empirical’ practices of migrants.49 Through the distinction 
between the ‘practices of migration’ and the ‘practices of migrants’ the members of Transit 
Migration intend to emphasise, that the moments of autonomy of migration can only be 
observed in the historical course of a multiplicity of migratory movements, but not by 
referring to the success or failure of individual migration projects. 
Yet, this emphasis on ‘practices of migration’ is prone to subsuming the varying lived 
experiences of concrete subjects under the subjectless and equalising abstraction of migration. 
Along these lines Nandita Sharma has convincingly criticised the CAM for subsuming the 
‘hundreds of millions of people who migrate’ under the totalising and therefore empty subject 
position of ‘the migrants’. She regards this move as ‘a form of symbolic violence’, which 
enables the CAM’s proponents to ignore ‘migrants’ classed, racialized, gendered, sexualized, 
territorialized bodies’ and ‘the meanings they themselves give to their experiences.’50 What is 
needed in light of this critique is then an acknowledgement of the crucial insight of feminist 
migration research, whereupon mobility is always embodied and relational, and that the lived 
experiences of migrants are therefore quite diverse.
51
  
This diversity arises, in fact, from both migrants’ unequal access to economic, social 
and cultural resources and their differential treatment by border regimes according to their 
respective subject positions in terms of class, ‘race’, gender and other sociopolitical relations. 
Critical scholars have shown, for instance, that informal, albeit institutionalised rules and 
‘suspect typologies’ for migration controls ‘lead inevitably to unequal probabilities [for 
migrants] of being apprehended by the police.’52 Others have demonstrated that ‘the 
application of immigration law is both sexist and racist’ despite of the public insistence on 
formal equality.
53
 To my mind, this informal, but nevertheless institutionalised unequal 
treatment of migrants is well captured by the CAM’s concept of differential inclusion. It 
stresses that it is the very function of border regimes to create differences between migrants 
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through their differential treatment and gradual disenfranchisement. But the existing CAM-
literature has not sufficiently considered so far, how this active fabrication of differences is 
dependent on and (re)productive of racist and sexist practices and economic inequalities.
54
 
I would like to argue for a situated re-reading of the notion of autonomy that accounts 
for both the diversity of migrants’ experiences and their varying possibilities to realise their 
migration projects due to their unequal access to resources in order to highlight the resulting 
multiplicity of their practices. Instead of leading to ‘naïve empiricism of the subject’55 such 
an approach would allow, first, for developing the concept of differential inclusion further. 
Secondly, it would underline that experience is always embodied and that ‘it is [therefore] 
nonsense to speak of a singular migrant subjectivity […because] there are […] a myriad of 
ways to be migrants, which are shaped by lines of class, gender and “race”.’56 Yann Moulier 
Boutang points towards a situated reading of the notion of autonomy when he argues that:  
 
Colonial as well as postcolonial situation, caste, ‘race’, gender, [and] ethnicity need to be considered conjointly. 
The significance of these categories has been acknowledged by now, and each of them has generated a new 
knowledge: Postcolonial and subaltern studies, minority studies, feminisms all have enriched the notion of 
autonomy with their respective perspective and invested it with an appropriate complexity. Autonomy is the 
opposite of heteronomy: not to be dependent, free of effects of domination. Only a situated knowledge (Donna 
Haraway) can be effectively independent, and correspondingly, one has to protect oneself from the effect of 
domination, that lurks beneath ‘objective’ thinking.57 
 
Moulier Boutang’s acknowledgment of the complexity of the notion of autonomy recognises 
the diversity of its conditions and the varying degrees of its possible realisation. Yet, none of 
the CAM’s advocates has so far pursued the implicit call to develop a more nuanced reading 
of autonomy, which is no longer prone to subsume and erase migrants’ varying experiences 
under a subjectless abstraction like migration.
58
 
But the need to re-think the CAM in way, which underscores the situatedness and the 
resulting diversity of migrants’ embodied experiences, becomes even more acute in context of 
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the technologisation of border controls. Critical scholarship on biometric rebordering points 
out that the differential treatment of migrants according to their positionality in sociopolitical 
power relations of class, ‘race’, gender, age and sexual orientation is both intensified and 
increasingly concealed through the biometrification of border controls.  
On the one hand, biometric technologies implicate a differentiation of how the border 
is experienced. This is far from surprising, if one considers that biometric technologies imply 
a shift from ‘border control to body control.’59 Since biometrics seek to verify the claimed 
identity of an individual by comparing a representation of one of its biometric features against 
a digitalised template that has been stored in a database or on an access card like a passport, 
they allow for a more differentiated and individualised approach towards border controls.
60
 
Biometrics permit to replace systematic checks for the targeted control of travellers classified 
as ‘risky’ at the physical border in order to accelerate the mobility of ‘trusted’ travellers. The 
latter submit themselves to pre-departure checks, thereby trading privacy for speed.
61
 The 
enrolment in a trusted traveller scheme like NEXUS in Northern America,
62
 ‘Project Iris’ in 
the UK
63
 or the SmartGate system in Australia
64
 allows ‘trusted travellers’ for an experience 
of ‘borders lite’, comprising fast lanes, business lounges and self-policing at automated 
border check posts.
65
 Travellers who do not want or simply can not participate in these 
programmes, either because they can not afford them or because ‘they come from the wrong 
background’ are, by contrast, automatically deemed ‘risky’.66 They have to queue repeatedly, 
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either for interrogations at consular posts whilst applying for a visa or for intensified 
inspections in airports upon arrival. By sorting individuals into fast-moving, low-risk ‘kinetic 
elites’ and slow-moving, high-risk ‘kinetic underclasses’ biometric borders actively produce 
mobile subjectivities.
67
 The differentiation of how the biometric border is experienced by 
particular individuals is, however, determined by their respective subject position in terms of 
class, country of origin, skin colour, gender, age and sexual orientation.
68
 Trusted traveller 
schemes highlight, moreover, that the alleged privilege to jump the queue, as well as the 
symbolic capital that comes with it, only come about in relation to the unprivileged in the 
queue. 
69
 What the usage of biometric technologies in voluntary trusted traveller schemes and 
databases only mandatory for those considered ‘high-risk’ then brings to the fore is that 
mobility is, in fact, always embodied and relational.  
On the other hand, it is precisely this connection between the differential treatment of 
mobile individuals and their respective positionality in terms of class, race and gender, which 
is concealed by biometric border controls technologies. The latter supposedly do not suffer 
from the prejudices shared by human beings as they verify a person’s claimed identity on the 
basis of features of its biological body independently of any factors, which might be regarded 
as discriminatory (such as class, ‘race’, gender or sexuality).70 Irma van der Ploeg has 
succinctly argued, by contrast, that biometrics transform the biological body into a machine 
readable ‘text’. She emphasises that ‘the meaning and significance’ of this machine readable 
text is contingent upon ‘the context’, in which it is produced, and the relations, which are 
established with other ‘texts’.71 It is through both the social context, in which biometrics are 
deployed, and the comparisons, for which the machine readable texts they produce are used, 
that all forms of discrimination in terms of class, ‘race’ and gender come into play.  
In the context of border controls, biometric technologies are not only used for the 
maintenance of the political and socioeconomic status quo by regulating the access to and 
exclusion from mobility, rights and geographical spaces. In addition, they also create new 
inequalities. The trusted traveller programmes mentioned above illustrate that biometric 
technologies contribute to the creation of a privileged ‘kinetic elite’. Membership to this 
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exclusive club is only open to those who can afford it and are classified as ‘low risk’. The VIS 
exemplifies, by contrast, that the enrolment into biometric databases becomes mandatory for 
all those, who are regarded as a security or ‘migration risk’. In order to be able to capture and 
critique these discriminatory effects of biometric borders it becomes necessary to develop the 
CAM as an approach, which conceives mobility as both embodied and relational. For feminist 
migration scholars have shown that unrestricted access to mobility of some is connected to the 
restriction of the access to mobility for others.
72
 But the CAM needs to better account for the 
diversity of migrants’ subject positions and the resulting diversity of their migration 
experiences and border crossing practices. This is necessary in order to retain the capacity to 
critique, how technologically ‘consolidated identities for some produce marginalised locations 
for others’ within material-semiotic contexts, in which sexist and racist discourse and 
practices are virulent.
73
 What becomes therefore even more urgent in the context of biometric 
rebordering is the development of a reading of autonomy that allows for a situated analysis of 
migrants’ embodied and consequently diverse encounters with and experiences of today’s 
biometric borders. 
 
 
The CAM revisited II: autonomy of migration despite of its securitisation? 
In addition, the CAM has been accused of an unfounded stylisation of migrants to self-reliant 
heroes of clandestine border crossing. In brief, critics maintain the CAM’s proponents would 
systematically gloss over the repressive and sometimes murderous effects of ever more 
restrictive border controls, which often resulted in the effective exclusion of migrants.
74
 In 
this section I argue that it becomes necessary to consider this criticism, because it becomes 
more warranted in the context of the securitisation of migration and interrelated processes of 
biometric rebordering. Biometric databases alter the encounters and power relations between 
migrants and border control authorities to such an extent that it becomes necessary to re-think 
some of the CAM’s core assumptions, including the notion of autonomy itself. 
 In my opinion, it is the insufficient consideration of the securitisation of migration and 
its bearing on the rationale and design of contemporary border regimes, which justifies the 
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allegation, whereupon the CAM plays down, or even ignores, the repressive and exclusionary 
effects of border controls. Prominent advocates of the CAM like Sandro Mezzadra have so far 
only paid lip-service to the fact that migration has been increasingly framed and treated as a 
security issue since the 1980s.
75
 While Mezzadra acknowledges that securitising practices are 
‘leading to a further restriction of their [irregular migrants] spaces and freedom of mobility’76 
he and other advocates on the CAM insist, nevertheless, that ‘the modus operandi of the 
migration regime […] revolves around the question of labour.’77 Following Mezzadra, today’s 
border regimes resemble ‘a complex dispositif, which is based both on the valorisation and 
containment of labour mobility.’78 In this account, the securitisation of migration emerges as 
nothing but a strategy for the ultimate economic endeavour to discipline migrants to a docile 
and exploitable workforce.  
I would like argue, by contrast, that the reading of the securitisation of migration as a 
‘modality for the global “irregularisation” of migrant labour’79 constitutes an oversimplifying 
economic reductionism. This economic reductionism misinterprets one of the effects of 
securitising practices – the facilitation of the exploitation of migrant labour through their 
illegalisation – as the overall rationale of the securitisation of migration. But the securitisation 
of migration cannot be subsumed under supposedly higher ranking economic ends, because it 
involves the invocation of a politics of fear that reduces possible migration policy options to 
strategies of distancing and neutralising the ‘risks’ that are associated with human mobility.80 
Through the politics of fear migrants are constructed as a risk for potential harm, which has to 
be kept at a spatial and social distance through a plethora of illiberal security practices.
81
 
Consequently, the securitisation of migration has, in fact, strong implications for the design, 
composition and underlying rationale of today’s border regimes.  
 This does, however, not imply that I propose to simply replace the prioritisation of the 
question of labour in the understanding and analysis of contemporary border regimes with the 
securitisation of migration. Nor do I suggest that the paradigm of exclusion, which has been 
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so vividly criticised by the CAM’s advocates, has become the dominant rationale of today’s 
border regimes due to the securitisation of migration. Numerous CSS-scholars have 
repeatedly shown that the security framing of migration does not implicate a repression of 
human mobility through a fortification of borders.
82
 Following Foucault, they have argued 
that security is not opposed to freedom of movement, but rather emerges as its ‘correlative’.83 
They emphasise that the speed and comfort of unrestricted mobility for the normalised 
majority of travellers hinges on the intensified control and possible banishment of those 
classified as ‘risky’. This particular mode of exclusion does, however, not work through the 
interdiction or prevention of mobility, but rather produces a mobile satellite population, which 
is kept at a social and spatial distance, but simultaneously on the move and in circulation.
84
 
Put differently, banishment does not aim at the repression, but at the institutionalisation of 
mobility as it deflects and reflects the movements of those deemed ‘undesirable’. This more 
nuanced reading of differential inclusion offered by critical security studies is better equipped 
to account for the restrictive effects of technologically ever more sophisticated border 
controls. It’s adoption by the CAM presupposes, however, to acknowledge that security does 
not only work as a force of differentiation, but also as ‘a force of abjection excluding risky 
migrants from trusted travellers’.85 It is then important to consider the securitisation of 
migration in the analysis and conceptualisation of border regimes, because it is the complex 
interplay between the obsession for maximum security brought about by the politics of fear 
and the economic imperative to facilitate the circulation of commodities and living labour, 
which fuels the ongoing technologisation of border controls. 
Instead of prioritising one of these allegedly conflicting governmental desires over the 
other, I therefore suggest to conceptualise contemporary border regimes with Foucault’s 
notion of the security dispositif. For the latter captures nicely that freedom is not a value in 
opposition to or in tension with security concerns. Rather, freedom constitutes a technique of 
government as it has been reframed as freedom of movement. As such, it provides the raison 
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d’être of the security dispositif.86 Following Foucault, Bigo argues that the reduction of 
freedom to the promise of global mobility without being stopped ultimately allows for 
‘policing in the name of freedom’,87 resulting in ever more pervasive dataveillance.88 In 
Foucault’s words, ‘[…] freedom [of movement] is nothing but the correlative development of 
apparatuses of security.’89 The security dispositif is not concerned with the protection of the 
territory of sovereign spaces, but with governing a population in a way that optimises its life 
potentials and its economic productivity.
90
 Its ‘problem […] is no longer that of fixing and 
demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, of 
sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement […], but in such a 
way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out.’91 Foucault indicates that 
the surveillance of the population becomes a substitute for the protection previously offered 
by the now dismantled city walls in order to identify individuals within the now freely 
circulating flows, who might impinge on the economic productivity of the population.
92
 He 
specifies that the security dispositif is concerned with anticipating, identifying, minimising 
potentially harmful elements within the circulating flows through the statistical calculation of 
possible future behaviours and events. Foucault’s stance that the security dispositif ‘works on 
the future’93 is in conflict with the CAM’s premise that migrations temporarily precede the 
attempts to control and regulate them. Yet, it is precisely the adoption of this endeavour to 
render uncertain futures knowable and actionable, which explains the appeal of contemporary 
border regimes to information, identification and surveillance technologies, thereby bringing 
the third element of the triptych security – freedom of movement – technology into play. 
I would therefore like to suggest that it is precisely the misreading of the securitisation 
of migration as a mere modality for the disenfranchisement and economic exploitation of 
migrants, which has hindered some of the most prominent advocates of the CAM so far to 
take the technologisation of border controls and its restrictive effects seriously. This is, 
however, important, because biometric databases and related border control technologies like 
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the planned entry-exit-system or the EUROSUR project alter the power relations and the 
encounters between migrants and border control authorities to such an extent that the general 
assertion of moments of autonomy of migration within any border regime regardless of its 
legal, practical and technological composition becomes, in fact, a highly dubious claim.  
I illustrate my argument with two examples relating to the VIS, because its impact on 
the possibilities of abjectified migrants to appropriate Schengen visa and subsequently stay in 
Europe is of particular relevance for the CAM’s core thesis. For contrary to the misleading 
scandalisation of boat migration in the media and by policy makers, most illegalised migrants 
in Europe do not cross the EU’s borders unauthorised, but enter via airports with a valid 
Schengen visa only to become illegal after it has expired.
94
 
The first example relates to the objective of the VIS to prevent the so-called practice of 
‘visa shopping’.95 This pejorative term refers to the strategy of visa applicants to lodge 
consecutive applications at consulates of several EU member states, after an initial application 
has already been turned down. While consulates of Schengen member states have begun to 
stamp the passports of rejected visa applicants, the latter could previously still lodge further 
applications at consulates of other member states by obtaining a new passport.
96
 Yet, the VIS 
efficiently forecloses this possibility for rejected applicants, because consular staff can now 
check in the biometric database, which also stores the fingerprint templates of rejected 
applicants for a period of five years, ‘if this fingerprint has already applied for a visa’.97 
 The second example refers to the objective of the VIS ‘to assist in the identification of 
any person who may not, or may no longer, fulfil the conditions for entry to, stay or residence 
on the territory of the Member States.’98 On a practical level, and in less euphemistic terms, 
the VIS shall facilitate the provision of travel documents for undocumented migrants, who try 
to hide their identity after being detected by the police, in order to accelerate their deportation. 
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As Dennis Broeders has rightly argued, the VIS will thereby function as a ‘system of re-
identification’ for so-called ‘visa-overstayers’.99 For the purpose of identification a newly 
generated template of a fingerprint is compared to the up to 70 million templates stored in the 
VIS. The apprehended person is then reidentified on the basis of the alphanumerical data, 
which is linked to the matching template. 
 Both examples highlight that biometric databases like the VIS try to establish what 
Philippe Bonditti has called traceability i.e. ‘the capacity of security agencies to recreate 
geographical, social and digital trajectories of individuals, goods, capital and data.’100 In case 
of the VIS, past trajectories of visa applicants, holders and overstayers can be reconstructed 
through the collection and storage of the traces they left behind, when they initially applied 
for a visa. Traceability then works through the creation of ‘data doubles’. David Lyon defines 
a data double as an ‘electronic profile compiled out of fragments of personal data of 
individuals.’101 This ‘digital alter ego’102 is then attached by means of biometrics to the body 
of the person it refers to in order to establish his or her traceability.
103
 In this context, it has 
been argued that the proliferation of biometric border control technologies is driven by the 
conception of the ‘human body […] as an indisputable anchor to which data can be safely 
secured.’104 More precisely, biometric technologies transform human bodies into pure 
information deprived of all corporality in order to create data doubles, which refer back to the 
individual concerned. The purpose of these data doubles is not to represent the individuals 
they refer to in an accurate manner, but to enable border control authorities to re-identify and 
make judgements about them.
105
 Ultimately, biometric databases like the VIS turn migrants’ 
bodies into a means of mobility control, thereby generating a new form of irregularity: the 
irregularity of the ‘data double’.106 
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It is precisely this new form of irregularity, which brings to the fore that biometric 
databases like the VIS intensify the restrictive and exclusionary effects of border controls as 
they forestall previously successful mobility strategies. It is through the generation of data 
doubles and the related establishment traceability of people’s migration histories that 
biometric databases like the VIS make it possible to synchronise controls and resulting 
sanctions. Information on visa applicants, which has been previously scattered over the 
countless folders of the 3.500 consular posts the EU’s member states maintain worldwide, 
does not only become available, it also accessible within seconds. Since the start of operation 
of the VIS it just takes consular staff a few seconds to check if an applicant has already been 
refused a visa and to reject his application.
107
 Through the storage of biometric characteristics 
it is no longer possible for apprehended migrants to forestall a deportation by destroying their 
passports and concealing their identity. Rather, visa overstayers are now haunted by their data 
doubles: If their fingerprints are stored in the VIS, it just takes authorities a few hours to 
establish their identity and country of origin in order to deport them as soon as possible. 
Hence, biometric technologies do not only imply a qualitative shift in the efficiency and scope 
of border controls. More importantly, biometric databases significantly alter the encounters 
and power relations between migrants and border control authorities. In case of the detection 
of undocumented migrants, border control authorities no longer depend on the cooperation of 
migrants to re-identify them, because their data doubles replace their narratives as a source of 
truth.
108
 Thereby, biometric databases considerably diminish migrants’ room for manoeuvre.  
To be clear: I am not arguing that biometric rebordering completely deprives migration 
of its moments of autonomy. Nor do I claim that the appropriation of mobility and rights has 
become impossible for abjectified migrants within biometric border regimes.
109
 My point is 
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rather that the introduction of biometric technologies for border control purposes significantly 
alters the practical terms and material conditions for the appropriation of mobility. The reason 
is that biometric technologies render migrants’ bodies as a means of control by transforming 
them into data doubles. Escaping these ‘digital alter egos’, which determine, if a person is 
granted a visa or not, and which enable the reconstruction of a person’s migration history in 
order to facilitate her deportation, is no longer simply a matter of burning ones passport. What 
the fact that asylum seekers have resorted to deliberately cutting or burning their fingerprints 
in order to prevent an enrolment into EURODAC indicates is that it will afford nothing less 
than to alter or destroy the minutiae of ones fingerprints.
110
  
What the example of biometric rebordering then illustrates is that the warranty of 
critique, whereupon the CAM does not sufficiently acknowledge the restrictive effects of 
border controls, increases in context of their technologisation. Biometric rebordering alters the 
power relations and encounters between migrants and border control authorities to such an 
extent that the general assertion of moments of autonomy of migration within any border 
regime regardless of its legal, material and technological composition becomes, in fact, a 
highly problematic claim. Ultimately, biometric rebordering stipulates a question, namely: 
What does the assertion of autonomy of migration refer to in the context of border regimes, 
which transform migrants’ bodies through the usage of biometrics into a means of mobility 
control? In light of this question I conclude that an acknowledgement of the restrictive effects 
implicated in the technologisation of border controls makes it necessary to rethink not only 
some of the CAM’s central features, but the notion of autonomy itself. 
 
 
Conclusion: Rethinking the autonomy of migration – rethinking autonomy 
In this article I have attributed the neglect of the technologisation of border controls and its 
effects on migrants’ room for manoeuvre by the existing CAM-literature to a misreading of 
the securitisation of migration as a mere means for the disenfranchisement and economic 
exploitation of migrant labour. In order to overcome this economic reductionism I have 
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proposed to draw on Foucault’s notion of the security dispositif to conceptualise today’s 
border regimes. As Foucault perceives the security dispositif primarily as a dispositif of 
circulation, it brings out that security concerns and the promotion of freedom of movement 
are not in tension, but operate in tandem. It is the interplay between the two, which drives the 
adoption of a pro-active risk management approach that in turn explains the ‘technological 
imperative’ characterising contemporary processes of rebordering. 
 But the conception of contemporary border regimes as security dispositifs affords to 
reconsider at least two of the CAM’s propositions. First, abjection and banishment have to be 
conceived as integral moments of governing human mobility through differential inclusion. 
Adopting the notion of banishment does, however, not imply a return to the paradigm of 
exclusion. In contrast to exclusion banishment does not aim at the repression of mobility, but 
at its institutionalisation. The abject are kept in constant rotation by being subjected to the 
paradoxical freedom of the ban ‘to go anywhere except where one wants to go.’111 This is 
important to note, because it was the paradigm of exclusion the CAM’s proponents sought to 
critique and replace with the notion of differential inclusion in the first place. 
 Second, the CAM needs a new justification for the analytical-strategical prioritisation 
of migrants’ practices. It is important to retain this feature of the CAM, because it efficiently 
allows for avoiding a control biased analysis of technologically ever more sophisticated 
borders regimes. But the CAM’s proposition, whereupon migration temporarily precedes the 
attempts to control and regulate it, becomes untenable in the face of the security dispositif’s 
risk management approach, which strives to render unknown future behaviours knowable in 
order to make them actionable and governable. What this pro-active risk management 
approach brings to the fore is that the CAM’s assumption of a temporal precedence of 
migration is underpinned by a reductive reading of power relations.
112
 It therefore becomes 
requisite to rethink the concept of autonomy in such a way that it offers an alternative, more 
convincing justification for analytical-strategical prioritisation of migrants’ practices. 
 This brings me to the final, albeit most crucial modification of the CAM: the challenge 
to rethink the meaning of autonomy in relation to migration. To engage with this challenge is 
necessary in order to develop the CAM as an approach, which is no longer prone to the 
accusation of being based on as well as contributing to a romanticisation of migration. It 
becomes urgent to engage with this challenge, because the warranty of the two allegations, 
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which fuel this major critique, increases in the context of biometric rebordering. The analysis 
of the impact of biometric technologies on migrants’ possibilities to appropriate mobility and 
rights allows me to indicate two starting points for the task to rethink autonomy as a concept. 
First, it is important to develop of a situated reading of autonomy, which captures, that 
mobility is always embodied and relational in order to bring out the diversity of migrants’ 
lived experiences and practices. This is a prerequisite for restoring the CAM’s capacity to 
critique the discriminatory effects of biometric borders. The latter imply a simultaneous 
intensification and concealment of the differentiation of how the border is experienced, 
depending on people’s subject position in terms of class, ‘race’, gender, country of origin, age 
and other factors. Donna Haraway’s concept of situated knowledge offers a promising starting 
point for such a re-reading of autonomy.
113
 
Second, a rethinking of autonomy needs to answer the question, what the assertion of 
an autonomy of migration refers to in the face of biometric border regimes, which transform 
migrants’ bodies into a means of mobility control. What the example of biometric rebordering 
brings to the fore is that governmental technologies for the regulation and control of human 
mobility have become so pervasive and intrusive that a rethinking of autonomy has to go 
beyond its Greek etymology of ‘self-legislation’. Nor is it credible any more to simply equate 
autonomy with some form of independency, as in the original formulation of the CAM’s core 
hypothesis in the pioneering work of Yann Moulier Boutang, as cited at the beginning of the 
article. Autonomy can no longer be thought as an attribute or a quality inherent to migration. 
Just as the forms and practices of migration are shaped by, and can therefore not be separated 
from, the conditions, under which they occur, the emergence of moments of autonomy can not 
be thought independently of the ever more pervasive and intrusive governmental technologies 
that seek to control and regulate migration. Autonomy has to be rethought as a relational 
concept. Ranabir Samaddar’s proposal to read autonomy as ‘the “Other” of governmentality’ 
might offer a promising starting point for this task.
114
 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to rethink the autonomy of migration, it 
should be underscored that this is an endeavour, which is both worthwhile and pertinent.  Not 
only, because the CAM’s reading of borders as sites of intensive political struggle over the 
selective denial and direct appropriation of mobility is well equipped to counter the growing 
de-politicisation of border controls. Nor only, because the CAM’s conception of borders as 
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conflictive encounters avoids a control biased analysis, which confirms the claims that drive 
the technologisation of border controls. But also, and most importantly, because the insight of 
renown migration scholar Stephen Castles, whereupon potential migrants ‘do not decide to 
stay put just because the receiving state says they are not welcome’, is still valid in the context 
of technologically ever more sophisticated border regimes.
115
 In other words, the question 
how moments of autonomy of migration emerge and persist becomes even more pertinent in 
the face of attempts to diminish migrants’ room for manoeuvre by turning their bodies into a 
means of mobility control. 
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